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Entanglement by Genes or Shares  
Hamilton´s rule of kin selection revisited 
Abstract 
Help within genetically related and unrelated organisms as well as 
investments of investors holding shares to different degree including 
charity can be understood within the ensemble concept. In an ensemble 
transfer of substrate from a source to a sink may result in superadditivity 
as well as subadditivity. The ensemble with the better net profit will 
prevail. Source and sink may be entangled by genes or shares. The 
degree of entanglement is expressed by an entanglement factor between 
zero and one. This entanglement factor may be (over)compensated by a 
success factor. In non-entangled parties a higher success factor is 
necessary for partial compensation. However, the over-compensation is 
only a local phenomenon. In entangled parties a higher success factor 
will completely over-compensate lower entanglement. The redistribution 
of substrate from source to two different sinks is an example of a target 
conflict between maximal yield and maximal yield increase. The success 
factor is a complex amalgam of unknown but interrelated equations and 
values. Besides transfer efficiencies, survival probabilities and number 
an important part of the success factor is the time frame. In organisms 
costing help for offspring is due to genetic entanglement and a longer 
lifespan of the young offspring versus the old parent. Exceptions from 
this rule (filial cannibalism) are completely encompassed by the concept. 
Long term investments will outperform short term investments always on 
the long run - in case they manage to survive on the short run!  
Keywords: ensemble, source, sink, net profit, Hamilton´s rule, success 
factor, entanglement factor, genetic reciprocity, inclusive fitness, charity, 
altruism, quantity, quality, hidden variable, group selection, target conflict 
Introduction 
Imagine the following situation: You are the owner of two companies. 
You hold 100% of the stocks of company A and - as a joint venture - 
50% of company B. The factories of both companies are identical and 
run out of raw material simultaneously. You have to buy new raw 
material but there will be only one batch. You have to decide which 
company will receive this batch. No other restrictions are known. The 
best decision is to give the raw material to the wholly owned company. 
This is business! But how do you decide in case you know that the 100% 
owned factory will be completely destroyed this night? 
Let us now consider you are a parent. You are 100% genetically related 
to yourself. Your offspring is genetically 50% identical to you. Both of you 
are hungry but there is only one portion of food. Parents give the food to 
the offspring. This is altruistic and genetically founded self-sacrificing 
love. 
Are business and parenthood really that different or are considerations 
and restrictions implied we are not aware of? In addition, life teaches that 
not all parents under all circumstances are that self-sacrificing.  
Economy is shaped by an organism and Biology is influenced by 
economic concepts (1, 2).  Altruism and selfishness are important 
concepts in Biology, Economics and Philosophy. However, altruism is a 
harmful behaviour as this concept implies the separation of benefit and 
cost. One party is paying the cost while a different party receives the 
benefit. Such a trait should be lost in evolution – and everywhere else, 
too. 
Hamilton introduced in two papers in 1964 (3, 4) the idea that altruism 
(leading to a negative benefit) would be stable in case both parties were 
genetically related. For an altruist the ratio of benefit to cost (b/c=k) 
should exceed the reciprocal value of the average relatedness (r°) 
between altruist and altruism recipient:   
-k>1/ r° (k>1) 
The contemporary spelling of Hamilton´s rule is: r*b>c. The small 
inequality teaches: genes should increase in frequency when the genetic 
relatedness (r) of the recipient to the actor times the additional 
reproductive benefit (b) gained by the recipient of the altruistic act 
exceeds the reproductive cost (c) to the individual performing the act. 
Both statements surprisingly differ very much. In Hamilton´s original 
statement we look at the negative benefit to cost ratio of a parent and 
compare this ratio with the degree of genetic relation to the offspring. In 
the now commonly used interpretation of Hamilton we look at the benefit 
of an offspring rated by the genetic distance in comparison to the cost of 
a parent. However, both viewpoints are incomplete and therefore must 
lead to wrong conclusions! 
 
Lex parsimoniae 
This law - also known as Ockham's razor - suggests that among 
competing hypotheses, the hypothesis with the fewest assumptions 
should be selected. Hamilton´s rule -k>1/r° and r*b>c follow the lex 
parsimoniae as they are very simple. However, they compare a negative 
benefit (malefit) per cost with a distance or benefit times a distance with 
a cost – things with different units. They are simple but wrong! 
In the real world we deal everywhere with physical quantities. A physical 
quantity is a numerical value times a dimensional unit. In physics it does 
not make sense to compare basic units like volume (m3) with mass (kg) 
directly. It is also not possible to convert volume into mass. Therefore, a 
derived unit is used – density (ρ=kg/m3). With the unit density it becomes 
easy to judge and understand whether a 1m3 solid block of steel or 1m3 
solid block of wood will sink or float in water – and why a boat made of 
1m3 steel will float, too. 
To match that basic scientific requirement in Biology it is necessary to 
compare different parties on their benefit to cost ratio or net profit 
weighted by the relatedness (an inverse, normalized distance). 
Relatedness is a value between 1 (100% identity, no distance) and zero 
(an infinite distance). Relatedness will later be called “entanglement” and 
is also called genetic reciprocity in Biology. The parties are entangled by 
the degree of informational identity.       
Let us use “b” as the dimensional unit of benefit and “c” as the 
dimensional unit of cost. A benefit to cost analysis in strangers (only self-
related, no entanglement) will now look this way:   
party A: 90b/10c (9 b/c) > party B: 120b/20c (6 b/c) 
In all my later considerations cost is a linear function of the substrate 
concentration and benefit is a saturating function of the substrate 
concentration according to the Michaelis-Menten equation. In case we 
compare both parties it is obvious that party B with a steep cost function 
has a smaller b/c ratio although the benefit is higher than in party A.  
In parent and offspring only about 50% of the genes are identical. And all 
genes are in two complete different metabolic and developmental states. 
Therefore, we have to compare at least the reproductive benefit of a 
parent per reproductive cost of a parent with the reproductive benefit of 
the offspring per reproductive cost of the offspring. In addition, both sides 
of the equation have to take the relatedness into account. 
Furthermore, I do not compare single parties. In past and the present 
paper I compare ensembles of parties transferring or not transferring 
substrate at different substrate concentrations. Active and inactive 
ensembles may be compared in the ensemble space (the three axes are 
the b/c ratio of ensemble and source and sink) or the transfer space (the 
three axes are substrate concentration in source and sink and net profit 
(b-c) of the active or inactive ensemble). Here I concentrate on the 
transfer space. The observations within this space are more direct as two 
axes are linear. 
Benefit and cost have aspects of quantity and quality. If source and sink 
share the same quality with respect to benefit and cost the transfer 
space and net profit are used. The difference of benefit and cost (b-c) is 
known as net profit. If quantity and quality of benefit and cost are 
different in source and sink the ensemble space is used. This is 
especially necessary when source and sink produce different benefits 
from the same substrate. The derived unit benefit cost ratio (b/c) is used 
here and could be called “bensity” or “bencosty” to remind us of the 
similarity to density.  
 
Basic assumptions and equations 
The structure of an ensemble has been described earlier (5, 6). In brief: 
An ensemble consists of a “source” (so), a productive entity where 
substrate may come from and a “sink” (si), a productive entity where 
substrate may go to. Both parties use the same substrate and may or 
may not transfer this substrate. The source will “give” or “give not”, the 
sink will “take” or “take not” the substrate depending on the degree of the 
actual benefit (b) to cost (c) ratio (source gives at bso-cso<0 (bso/cso<1), 
sink takes at bsi-csi>0 (bsi/csi>1)). In an inactive ensemble no substrate is 
transferred, in an active ensemble substrate is transferred. 
Besides inactive and active ensembles there are independent and 
dependent ensembles. In an independent (autonomous) ensemble (6) 
varying amounts of substrate are transferred only from the source in the 
condition bso-cso<0 (bso/cso<1) to the sink in bsi-csi>0 (bsi/csi>1). The transfer 
stops when one or both sides reach b-c=0 (b/c=1). In a dependent 
ensemble (5) a constant amount of substrate is taken away from the 
source and given to the sink. This type of transfer is also enforced under 
non-favoured conditions in a source like bso-cso≥0 (bso/cso≥1) or in a sink 
like bsi-csi≤0 (bsi/csi≤1). This may be compared to genetic programming or 
taxes combined with forced subsidy. 
The reaction velocity (v) of the benefit production is a saturating function 
of the substrate concentration [S] according to Michaelis-Menten (7).  
 
In an inactive ensemble both parties produce benefit separately:  
bso∼vso;  vso=([Sso]/(Kmso+[Sso])*Vmaxso  
bsi∼vsi;  vsi=([Ssi]/(Kmsi+[Ssi+])*Vmaxsi 
 
or the parties transfer a small amount of substrate ∆S and are active: 
bso∼vso; vso=([Sso-∆S]/(Kmso+[Sso-∆S])*Vmaxso;  
bsi∼vsi; vsi=([Ssi+∆S]/(Kmsi+[Ssi+∆S])*Vmaxsi 
 The cost is a linear function of the substrate concentration: 
inactive: cso=[Sso]*kso;  csi=[Ssi]*ksi     (k=constant) 
active: cso=[Sso-∆S]*kso;  csi=[Ssi+∆S]*ksi     (k=constant) 
 
The net profit of the ensemble is: (be-ce)=(bso-cso)+(bsi-csi). Although the 
parties are called “source” and “sink” they do not always act as source or 
sink in case the ensemble is inactive. The wording “symmetric ensemble” 
in the following paper will indicate that Km (substrate concentration at 
Vmax/2), Vmax (maximal reaction velocity) and cost factor k are identical 
in source and sink. Other factors may be asymmetric. 
Two additional factors have to be considered: entanglement and 
success. The entanglement factor is called “ef”: Two parties can be 
entangled in four different ways: (efso)so, (efsi)si, (efsi)so and (efso)si.  
The entanglement factor of a source with the source ((efso)so) or a sink 
with the sink ((efsi)si) will in organisms usually equal 1 as the organism is 
genetically completely self-related. The entanglement factor with another 
organism (entanglement of the source with the sink (efsi)so and 
entanglement of the sink with the source (efso)si will vary from ef1 
(identical clones) to ef0.75 (sisters in bees and ants) to ef0.5 (parents 
and children, full siblings) to ef0.25 (grandparent and grandchild, half 
siblings) and ef0 (strangers) (8). The quantitative fate of one party will 
appear in the quality balance of the other party. In organisms this will be 
a symmetric entanglement. In the following considerations only a single 
entanglement factor is therefore given. A parent and his offspring for 
example are both 50% genetically identical and therefore the 
entanglement for both is ef0.5. In economy this is more flexible. 
Entanglements here can be asymmetric. To buy a share buys 
entanglement. The share owner is now to a certain degree entangled 
with the company. The company is not entangled with him. However, this 
depends on law, common practice and the organisation structure of the 
shareholders including genetic entanglement within the shareholders and 
company members or the size of the entanglement.  
The definitions of “success factor” are countless. A success factor (sf) 
here is a result of numerous interdependent and independent 
considerations. It is a number with the ability to compensate for low 
entanglement. The success factor is a composite value of many factors 
and components. Two of these components in Biology are survival 
probability and number. It is known from birds that artificially increasing 
the number of eggs will reduce the survival probability of the fledglings. 
The capacity of parental care and the appropriate offspring number 
seems to be optimized by evolution. The equations determining how an 
increase or decrease in one of the components of the success factor will 
influence the change of the other components of the success factor and 
whether the success factor will grow or shrink belong to the core 
questions and knowledge of Biology and Economics; including the 
mutual influence of Biology and Economy (e.g. fertility decline). 
The following abbreviations are used: 
sfsonoT; the success factor of a source with no transfer of substrate  
sfsinoT; the success factor of a sink with no transfer of substrate 
sfsoT; the success factor of a source with transfer of substrate  
sfsiT; the success factor of a sink with transfer of substrate  
 
In the calculations it will be generally assumed that transfer will decrease 
the success of source and increase the success of sink:  
sfsonoT≥sfsoT and sfsiT≥sfsinoT. 
Source and sink form an ensemble. The ensemble redistributes 
substrate from source to sink. In the real world there will be a species 
specific coupling between the size of decrease in source and the size of 
increase in sink. In extension of this idea the success factor could be 
interpreted as a saturating benefit with a linear cost, too (5). A decrease 
in source therefore may also result in: sfsonoT≤sfsoT and sfsiT≤sfsinoT (only 
one example of the transfer of a burden will be presented).  
In addition, the entanglement factor is a fixed long term component and 
the success factor a fixed short term component. The short term 
component could be time dependent and increase or decrease with time 
(sft=sf0*e±λt.). In a first period of competition between two ensembles the 
success factor of ensemble A may over-compensate a small 
entanglement factor of A. Within this time period the ensemble B with a 
low success factor but a high entanglement factor may decrease or 
vanish. Vanishing would eliminate the ensemble B with the long term 
strategy. In a second period of the competition the success factor of 
ensemble A may have decreased very much so that now ensemble B will 
win due to the combination of success and entanglement factor. The 
long term strategy will prevail. Although we have to assume that in a long 
lasting evolutionary process this has happened repeatedly there will be a 
mixture of short and long term strategies. For example investment in 
reproduction is a long term strategy and investment in muscles, claws 
and teeth is a short term strategy. Both strategies are successfully used. 
The following considerations include no time dependence of the size of 
sf. Within the considered time period sf has a constant value and the 
result of the comparison of two ensembles with different sf is ultimate – 
for this time period. 
Net profit of an inactive ensemble (transfer space): 
((bso-cso)*efso+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so*sfsonoT+((bso-cso)*efso + (bsi-csi)*efsi)si*sfsinoT 
Benefit/cost ratio of an inactive ensemble (ensemble space): 
(bso/cso * efso + bsi/csi * efsi)so*sfsonoT + (bso/cso * efso + bsi/csi * efsi)si*sfsinoT 
In an active ensemble the source transfers a small amount of substrate 
∆S to the sink. The result is a nonlinear increase or decrease in benefit 
and a linear increase or decrease in cost.  
Net profit of an active ensemble (transfer space): 
((bso-cso)*efso+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so*sfsoT+((bso-cso)*efso + (bsi-csi)*efsi)si*sfsiT 
Benefit/cost ratio of an active ensemble (ensemble space): 
(bso/cso * efso + bsi/csi * efsi)so*sfsoT + (bso/cso * efso + bsi/csi * efsi)si*sfsiT 
Results 
In this section I avoid to look at special cases. I will observe in general 
active and inactive dependent ensembles under different degrees of 
entanglement (ef0, ef0.25, ef0.5, ef0.75 and ef1) and different success 
factors (sf0.001 to sf2.5). Later, in the discussion section I will assign the 
observations here to mainly biological cases. Asymmetric or independent 
(autonomous) ensembles with brute force or deception will follow in an 
additional work. 
The starting point of my considerations is the inactive ensemble of not 
entangled parties. It will serve as reference although it may be difficult to 
view this as an ensemble. Two parties are isolated productive and do not 
transfer substrate. They invest only in themselves. They are neither 
source nor sink although they appear as such in figure 1. This self-
investment results in saturating benefit and is accompanied by linear 
increase in cost for both parties. As the increase of cost is linear while 
the increase of productivity is saturating the inactive, symmetric 
(dependent) and not entangled ensemble has a maximal net profit (b-c) 
indicated by a yellow plain (fig. 1). The red dot within this plain (0.5mM 
source, 0.5mM sink) is the peak of the red surface and the maximal net 
profit (both parties combined). This maximum serves now as reference. 
The net profit of an active or entangled ensemble at a distinct pair of 
substrate concentrations in source and sink may be larger 
(superadditivity) than the net profit of the inactive not-entangled 
ensemble at the identical substrate concentrations. However, below the 
yellow surface there will be always the possibility that a different pair of 
substrate concentrations of an inactive ensemble will have a better net 
profit or will be at least as good as an active ensemble. Above the yellow 
surface any ensemble has always a better net profit and will always 
prevail against the ensemble of figure 1.  
Figure 1 
 
Figure 1: The inactive, (dependent), symmetric, not entangled ensemble is depicted 
in red. We view the ensemble from the front (A) and back (B) and in a top-down 
perspective (C). In A the substrate concentration in source is to the left, sink to the 
right and net profit (b-c) of the ensemble is on the z-axis. The success factor is sf1 for 
both parties and the entanglement is ef0. The yellow surface touches the maximum 
of the net profit. This maximum is the reference in the following pictures. The red dot 
in C indicates the location of this maximum within the reference surface. The Km 
value of this symmetric ensemble is 0.25mM, the Vmax value is 5mM in source and 
in sink and the linear cost c=8*Km for source and sink. No substrate is transferred.  
 
In figure 2 we look at an entangled (symmetric, inactive, dependent) 
ensemble with an entanglement factor of ef0.5. Here, 50% of the sinks 
quantity (see discussion of the methodology) in net profit will appear in 
the balance of the source as quality and vice versa. The red surface will 
pierce the yellow reference surface although no transfer of substrate with 
an improved net profit of quantity has occurred. The increase is solely 
owed to the fact that both parties are entangled now and share quality. 
 
Figure 2 
 
Figure 2: The inactive, (dependent), symmetric, entangled ensemble is depicted in 
red. We view the ensemble from the front (A) and back (B) and in a top-down 
perspective (C). In D we look top down at a cross section within the yellow reference 
surface. In A the concentration in source is to the left, sink to the right and net profit 
(b-c) of the ensemble is on the z-axis. The success factor is sf1 for both parties and 
the entanglement is ef0.5. The red surface penetrates the yellow plain over a wide 
range of concentrations. The Km value of this symmetric ensemble is 0.25mM, the 
Vmax value is 5mM in source and in sink and the linear cost c=8*Km for source and 
sink. No substrate is transferred.  
 
Now let us look at an inactive, (dependent), symmetric, entangled 
ensemble with a low success factor (sfsi0.1) in sink (fig. 3). The red 
surface no longer touches the yellow surface although there is still 
entanglement. 
 
 Figure 3 
 
Figure 3: The inactive, (dependent), symmetric, entangled ensemble with a weak 
party is depicted in red. Again we view the ensemble from the front (A) and back (B) 
and in a top-down perspective (C). In A the concentration in source is to the left, sink 
to the right and net profit of the ensemble is on the z-axis. The success factor is 
sfsonoT1 for source and sfsinoT0.1 for sink and the entanglement is ef0.5 for both sides. 
The red ensemble surface no longer reaches the yellow reference surface. The Km 
value is still 0.25mM in source and sink, the Vmax value is 5mM in source and in sink 
and the linear cost c=8*Km for source and sink. Again, no substrate is transferred.  
 
As both parties are symmetrically entangled (ef0.5) the low success 
factor (sfsinoT0.1) will also affect the source although there is no transfer 
of substrate decreasing the productivity in source. In figure 4 we observe 
the changes taking place when the symmetric, entangled ensemble of 
figure 3 becomes active by an externally induced (dependent) transfer of 
substrate from source to sink. The success factor of source decreases 
after transfer of substrate a little (sfsonoT1 to sfsoT 0.9).  
 
Figure 4 
 
Figure 4: Now we look at an active, dependent, symmetric, entangled ensemble with 
a weak party. Again, this ensemble is depicted from the front (A) and back (B) and in 
a top-down perspective (C). The yellow reference surface is penetrated by the green 
surface in a wide concentration range. In D we look top down at a cross section 
within the reference surface. The red dot is the maximal value of figure 1 at a single 
concentration in source and in sink. This maximum is surrounded by a green curve 
indicating the concentrations combinations equal or better in the active ensemble. 
The shape of the closed curve in 4D looks similar to a bean curve and will be called 
simply “curve”. In A the concentration in source is to the left, sink to the right and net 
profit of the ensemble is on the z-axis. The success factor after transfer is sfsoT0.9 for 
source and sfsiT1 for sink and the entanglement is ef0.5 for both sides. 1µmol/l is 
transferred. 
This small transfer however increases the success factor of the sink 
dramatically (sfsinoT0.1 to sfsiT1). Through the entanglement and the 
general setting the small loss in source is overcompensated over a large 
concentration range by the drastic increase in success in sink. This type 
of ensemble will be active and successful in many low concentration 
ranges in comparison to even the best value achievable by an inactive, 
not entangled ensemble (0.5mM; b-c=0 or b/c=1). In this region the 
source will successfully give although b-c>0 (b/c>1). This ensemble will 
prevail against an ensemble of “self-investing” parties (red dot, figure 4 
D) although they have both a success factor of 1.  
Ensembles have internal variables like Km, Vmax and cost. I have 
introduced two further variables; entanglement “ef” and success “sf”. In 
the following pictures we are going to compare ensembles only varying 
“ef” and “sf” at different concentrations in source and sink (fig. 5). The 
biochemical part of the ensemble (Km, Vmax, cost) stays unchanged 
symmetric. The relationship of the success factors in source and sink 
however are strongly asymmetric. In my examples a transfer reduces 
usually the success factor in source only from sf1 to sf0.9 while the 
success factor in sink will rise from sf0.1 to sf1. This will be discussed 
later in more detail. Here I want to argue in brief that this is not unusual 
e.g. in parents feeding offspring. The lost food portion (including a 
reduction in parental success) to the even hungry but mature parent will 
have a much higher contribution to the success of the still growing 
offspring.   
Let us at first compare the effect of different success and entanglement 
factors with and without transfer of substrate in figure 5. There the effect 
of different factors is observed by a cross section within the reference 
surface. 
Figure 5 
 
Figure 5: We look at a cross section (top down) within the reference surface similar to 
figure 3D and 4D. The red dot is the maximal value of figure 1 at a single 
concentration in source and in sink (0.5mM). This maximum is surrounded by one red 
and several green curves. The different ef and sf are indicated within the picture. All 
other variables are identical. 
 
We observe a series of concentric curves in the plane of the reference 
surface. “No transfer” with ef1.0 and sfsinoT0.1 results in the smallest 
curve (red). The curve with ef1.0 is the largest of all curves with sfsiT1. 
However, rising to sfsiT2 will be better even if the entanglement drops to 
ef0.5. The surface areas above the reference surface can also be 
calculated: ef0.25; sfsiT1=2.52(mol/l)2. ef0.5; sfsiT1=9.74(mol/l)2. ef0.75; 
sfsiT1=21.26(mol/l)2. ef1; sfsiT1=37.06(mol/l)2. ef0.5; sfsiT2=59.83(mol/l)2.  
In figure 6 we look at cross-sections of figure 5. 6A is parallel to the 
source axis and 6B is parallel to the sink axis; both cross-sections 
through the red dot.  
 
Figure 6  
 
Figure 6: We look at a cross section parallel to source (A) and sink (B) axis through 
the red dot (0,5mM, figure 5). The different graphs are identified within the picture. All 
active ensembles cross the yellow reference line (reference surface in figure 5). In 
active ensembles the success factor of source drops from sfnoT1.0 to sfT0.9 while sf in 
sink rises from sfnoT0.1 to sfT1. Here the graphs under the yellow reference surface 
are visible, too. They are the inactive ensembles of ef0.25, ef0.5 and ef0.75 (bottom 
to top). The success factor within the inactive ensemble is sfsonoT1 for source and 
sfsinoT0.1 for sink. The yellow line is the side view of the reference surface.  
 
From figure 6 A and B it is understandable why in figure 5 only ef1.0, 
sfnoT1 of the inactive ensemble was visible. The other inactive ensembles 
are hiding below the reference surface. 
 
In figure 7 we compare 2 groups of two ensembles with an entanglement 
of ef0.5. Group A: sfsonoT1, sfsoT0.9, sfsinoT0.1, sfsiT2 with group B:  sfsonoT1, 
sfsoT0.9, sfsinoT2, sfsiT2. The source pays always a cost in case of transfer 
but in B the success of sink is independent from transfer or no transfer. 
 
Figure 7 
 
Figure 7: A top down view on reference plane with green and red graphs of active 
and inactive, dependent, symmetric, entangled ensembles. We compare 2 groups of 
with entanglement ef0.5. Group A: sfsonoT1 drops to sfsoT0.9; sfsinoT0.1 increases to 
sfsiT2; here the success of sink depends on transfer. Group B:  sfsonoT1 drops again to 
sfsoT0.9 and sfsinoT2 is equal to sfsiT2; now success is independent of transfer. 
 
In figure 7A the net profit of sink is dependent on transfer of substrate 
within the ensemble. We only observe a green curve enclosing all 
concentration pairs of source and sink equal to or better than the 
reference surface. Without transfer the red surface of the dependent, 
entangled, symmetric and inactive ensemble is not able to even touch 
the reference surface, we can´t see the red surface hiding under the 
yellow surface. In figure 6B, the net profit of sink is independent of 
transfer within the ensemble. We observe that now the dependent, 
symmetric, inactive ensemble (red curve) is slightly better than the active 
ensemble (green curve). We already know from our initial observations 
that transfer is reasonable in entangled parties when the increased 
success factor in sink compensates the decreased success factor in 
source even at low substrate concentrations in source. However, in case 
the success factor of sink is independent of substrate transfer the 
ensemble with no transfer will have a better net profit. 
 
Now I compare entangled parties with non-entangled parties. 
Entanglement is a double edged sword. It is a powerful feature when two 
parties share high quality. It will be a problem if low quality is shared 
within two parties. But not sharing any quality should be always inferior. 
The question is whether an increased success factor is able to 
compensate for a lack in entanglement.  
In figure 8 we observe the complex behaviour of the ensembles. The 
compensation of entanglement ef0.5 with sfsiT1 (fig. 8; arrow 4) by a not 
entangled ensemble (ef0) is only possible at sfsiT2 (fig. 8; arrow 3). This 
compensation however is not valid for all concentrations in source and 
sink. An entanglement of ef0.5 with sfsiT2 can be compensated in ef0 by 
sfsiT2.5 (fig. 8, arrow 1 and arrow 2).  The blue curve is deformed and 
only at a few concentrations pairs (high and very low concentrations) the 
not entangled ensemble is superior. The compensation in the absence of 
entanglement is only a local phenomenon. In all other areas the 
entangled ensemble is still superior. At the same degree of entanglement 
(ef0.5) a higher success factor (sfsiT2>sfsiT1) will compensate at all 
concentrations (fig. 8 arrow 2 and 4). At sfsiT2 ef0 is always inferior to 
ef0.5 (arrow 2 and 3). 
Figure 8 
 
Figure 7: We look (top down) at a cross section within the reference surface similar to 
figure 5. The red dot is the maximal value of figure 1 at a single concentration in 
source and in sink (0.5mM). This maximum is surrounded by one red and several 
green and blue curves. They differ in ef and sf. All other variables are identical. The 
red is the inactive ensemble with ef1 and sfnoT1. The other curves (green and blue) 
belong to active ensembles. All blue curves belong to ef0 and all green curves 
belong to ef0.5. Arrow 4 points to an entangled ensemble with ef0.5, sfsoT0.9 and 
sfsiT1, arrow 3 points to a not entangled ensemble (ef0, sfsoT0.9 and sfsiT2). Arrow 2 
points to an entangled ensemble with ef0.5, sfsoT0.9 and sfsiT2 and arrow 1 points to 
an ensemble with no entanglement ef0, sfsoT0.9 but sfsiT2.5. The two black circles 
highlight the areas of better net profit in not entangled parties with better success 
factor at low substrate concentration in source. 
 
In direction of source (fig. 9A) we observe local superiority of the not 
entangled ensemble but in direction of sink the not entangled ensemble 
is never superior (fig. 9B) above the reference surface. Below the 
reference surface self-investing ensembles are always a competitor.  
 
Figure 9 
 
Figure 9: Again we look at a cross section parallel to source (A) and sink (B) axis. 
Active ensembles are all above the yellow reference line (reference surface in figure 
8) including one inactive clone (red). The numbering of arrows complies with figure 8.  
Below the yellow line we observe hitherto unseen ensembles. The blue graph is an 
active not entangled ensemble (ef0) with sfsoT0.9, sfsiT1.  The red graph is an inactive 
ensemble with ef0.5; sfsonoT1, sfsinoT0.1. The black graph is an inactive, not entangled 
ensemble (ef0; sfsonoT1, sfsinoT0.1). In active ensembles the success factor of source 
drops from sfsonoT1.0 to sfsoT0.9 while the success factor in sink rises from sfsinoT0.1 to 
sfsiT1.  
 
In non-entangled ensembles the success factor is able to compensate 
for missing entanglement, however only to a small extent in a certain 
region of the transfer space. The source invests at high or low substrate 
concentrations and the ensemble of strangers will be locally superior to 
an entangled ensemble with lower success factor (fig. 9A, 1 vs. 2 and 3 
vs. 4). This is a local phenomenon because the entangled ensembles 
are superior in all other concentrations. In the absence of entanglement 
the source will not get back its investments in terms of quality. It pays 
only for the sink and therefore also for the ensemble. The reason is that 
substrate is moved to a place not of better productivity but of higher 
success. The source loses substrate and net profit in terms of quantity 
without participating in a high quality increase. The sink gets quantity and 
in addition does not participate in the quality loss in source. This all is a 
heavy load for the source. As the substrate decreases in source the 
ensemble of strangers will lose the local superiority in the next period.  In 
case both success factors of source and sink are identical the 
decreasing substrate in source will not be compensated by an increase 
in sink (non-linear relationships). Over several periods the ensemble will 
lose the source. The local improvement of the ensemble means for the 
source an improvement of general quantity but not of personal quality. At 
the same success factor it is even better not to invest in ef1 than to 
investment into ef0. 
 
Success factor and entanglement factor are able to compensate each 
other also in entangled parties. This is demonstrated in figure 10 and 11. 
The difference in entanglement has been adjusted to ef0.25 and ef0.5 
within the two compared ensembles. The success factors in both 
ensembles have been chosen so that at low entanglement the success 
factor will be larger than at higher entanglement. In figure 10 we have a 
top down view of a cross section within the reference surface, 
 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 10: We look at a cross section within the reference surface. The red dot is 
surrounded by a single green curve of an ensemble with a source (ef0.25; sfsoT0.9) 
investing in a sink (ef0.25; sfsiT1). No curve of ef0.5 is visible. 
 
Only a single curve of the ensemble with low entanglement but high 
success factor is observable. The other curves hide under the reference 
surface (fig. 11). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
 
Figure 11: The cross section parallel to source (A) and sink (B) axis of figure 9 shows 
much more details. Only one active ensemble (green, source ef0.25; sfsoT0.9 and 
sink ef0.25; sfsiT11) is above the yellow reference line (reference surface in figure 10). 
The same ensemble but inactive (source ef0.25; sfsonoT1 and sink ef0.25; sfsiT0.1) is 
represented by the red graph. A transfer of substrate increases the success factor of 
sink by a factor of 10. 
The blue graph is an active ensemble with ef0.5 (source ef0.5; sfsoT0.9 and sink 
ef0.5; sfsiT0.2). The black graph is the inactive ensemble with the same entanglement 
factor (ef0.5) but “no transfer” (source ef0.5; sfsonoT1 and sink ef0.5; sfsinoT0.1). Here a 
transfer of substrate increases the success factor of sink only by a factor of 2. 
 
 
The difference in entanglement (ef0.25 and ef0.5) is considerable. 
However, this difference is easily compensated by an increase in 
success factor after transfer from sfsinoT0.1 to sfsiT1 (red and green) in 
comparison to sfsinoT0.1 to sfsiT0.2 (black and blue). In the edge region at 
low net profit values (b-c, ensemble axis) the sequence is reversed in 
direction of sink (fig. 11B). As control the four surface areas above zero 
net profit (b-c>0) have been calculated. (green: ef0.25; sfsoT0.9, sfsiT11 
=52,02(mol/l)2. red: ef0.25; sfsonoT1, sfsinoT0.1 =26,15(mol/l)2. blue: ef0.5; 
sfsoT0.9, sfsiT0.2 =29,96(mol/l)2. black: ef0.5; sfsonoT1, sfsinoT0.1 
=30,23(mol/l)2). The lower entanglement (ef0.25<ef0.5) is still 
compensated by the higher success factor (sfsiT1>sfsiT0.2). It is not a 
local phenomenon. 
The system is set up in a way that transfer always lowers the success 
factor of the source and will increase the success factor of the sink. What 
happens if a transfer lowers the success factor of a source to zero? Let 
us look at figure 12. 
 
Figure 12 
 
Figure 11: Again I compare two ensembles in an active (green, blue) and an inactive 
(red, black) state with cross sections parallel to source (A) and sink (B) axis at 0.5mM 
(red dot). Both ensembles share the same entanglement factor (ef0.5) and different 
but very low success factors. All ensembles exist far below the yellow reference line. 
The green (active) and red (inactive) graph stand for an ensemble which will go on. 
Here sfsonoT0.2 drops to sfsoT0.1 in source while the sink will increase sfsinoT0.001 to 
sfsiT0.01. The blue (active) and black (inactive) graphs stand for an ensemble which 
will in case of activity end. Here sfsonoT0.001 drops to sfsoT0 in source while the sink 
will increase sfsinoT0.2 to sfsiT0.5 (complete consumption of source).   
 
A top down view on the yellow reference surface is not given as all 
ensembles are far below this plane. The blue, active ensemble has the 
highest net profit. Here the complete source is consumed by the sink. 
However, although the source is lost, the ensemble has the best net 
profit. The surface areas of the positive net profit (b-c>0) is giving the 
same result as figure 12 (green: ef0.5; sfsiT0.01, sfsoT0.1 =7.59(mol/l)2; 
red: ef0.5; sfsinoT0.001, sfsonoT0.2 =8.65(mol/l)2; blue: ef0.5; sfsiT0.5, sfsoT0 
=13.27(mol/l)2; black: ef0.5; sfsinoT0.2, sfsonoT0.001 =8.65(mol/l)2) and 
recalls the same message: neither feed nor beat nor ride a dead horse, 
take the saddle and leave.  
 
In all considerations up to now there was a single source and a single 
sink. In consequence of this simple arrangement there was no alternative 
where the substrate would come from or where it would go to.  Now I am 
going to look at one source investing in two entangled sinks and two (not 
entangled) sources investing in one entangled sink.  
At first I test the effect of the same amount of substrate in two alternative 
sinks with different success factors but the same degree of entanglement 
(ef0.5). In the first alternative sink the transferred substrate will raise the 
success factor considerably from sfsinoT0.1 to sfsiT0.6 (blue curve, fig. 13) 
however to only a smaller final value than in the other alternative sink 
sfsinoT0.7 to sfsiT0.8 (green curve, figure 13). The increase of the success 
factor in the second alternative sink with the same amount of substrate 
would be much smaller but the final success factor would have a larger 
value than in the first alternative.  
 
 
Figure 13 
 
Figure 13: Again we look (top down) at a cross section within the reference surface. 
The red dot indicates the maximum of a not entangled and inactive ensemble 
(0.5mM). Three curves are visible. The green curve is an active ensemble: ef0.5; 
sfsiT0.8, sfsoT0.9, the red is the same but inactive ensemble: ef0.5; sfsinoT0.7, 
sfsonoT1and a blue curve of an active ensemble: ef0.5; sfsiT0.6, sfsoT0.9. The inactive 
ensemble belonging to the blue curve is under the yellow plane and therefore not 
visible (see figure 14).  
 
The increase can be extracted from the surface areas above b-c=0: 
green: ef0.5; sfsiT0.8, sfsoT0.9 =52.81(mol/l)2; red: ef0.5; sfsinoT0.7, sfsonoT1 
=47.54(mol/l)2; blue: ef0.5; sfsiT0.6, sfsoT0.9 =42.66(mol/l)2; black: ef0.5; 
sfsinoT0.1, sfsonoT1 =30.23(mol/l)2) 
Green surface minus red surface =5.27(mol/l)2,  11% increase in surface 
area; final success factor sfsiT0.8 
Blue surface minus black surface =12.43(mol/l)2, 41% increase in 
surface area; final success factor sfsiT0.6 
A low increase in (mol/l)2 in one ensemble is connected to a high final 
success factor. A high increase in (mol/l)2 in the other ensemble is 
connected to a low final success factor.  
 
Figure 14 
 
Figure 14: We see four graphs: The red graph is an inactive ensemble: ef0.5; 
sfsinoT0.7, sfsonoT1. The green graph is an active ensemble: ef0.5; sfsiT0.8, sfsoT0.9. 
The black graph is an inactive ensemble ef0.5; sfsinoT0.1, sfsonoT1. The blue graph is 
an active ensemble: ef0.5; sfsiT0.6, sfsoT0.9. The black arrows indicate the increase 
from the inactive to the active ensemble. 
 
The second combinatorial possibility to “one source invests in two sinks” 
is “two sources invest in the same sink”. Many different combinations of 
entanglement and success factors are imaginable. As example I will 
concentrate on a performing and two underperforming ensembles with 
ef0.5 between sources and sink. The two sources are determined to 
make the final success factor of sink sfsiT1. Therefore, in an 
underperforming group of sources one source has to compensate for the 
lack of giving in the second source. As the production of benefit is a 
saturating function there will be nonlinear more to give for the performing 
source. In an underperforming sink both sources have to give in a non-
linear way more to compensate the underperforming sink. As there are 
now three parties the net profit of the ensemble is calculated according 
to:  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so1*sfso1noT +  
((bso2-cso2)*efso2+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so2 *sfso2noT +  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1 + (bso2-cso2)*efso2 + (bsi-csi)*efsi)si*sfsinoT 
 
((bso1-cso1)*efso1+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so1*sfso1T+ 
((bso2-cso2)*efso2+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so2*sfso2T+  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1 + (bso2-cso2)*efso2 + (bsi-csi)*efsi)si*sfsiT 
 
As there are now two sources the yellow reference surface is the 
maximal net profit of three self-investing parties. The red point is omitted. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
 
Figure 15: We see four curves on the reference surface (top down view) of three 
parties. The inner dashed curve is an inactive ensemble of three parties:  ef0.5; 
sfsinoT0.1, sfso1noT1, sfso2noT1. The yellow surface indicates the maximum of three self-
investing parties. The sources are entangled with the sink but not with each other. 
The green curve is an active ensemble with three performing parties: ef0.5; sfsiT1, 
sfso1T0.8, sfso2T0.8.  
The red curve is an active ensemble with an underperforming source:  ef0.5; sfsiT1, 
sfso1T0.6, sfso2noT0.9. The second source gives less. This must be compensated by 
the first source to make sink reach sfsiT1. 
The blue curve is an active ensemble with an underperforming sink:  ef0.5; sfsiT1, 
sfso1T0.7, sfso1noT0.7. Both sources have to give more to make sink reach sfsiT1.  
  
In all curves the two sources are entangled with the sink by the same 
factor; ef0.5. Without transfer the sink has a low success factor; sfsinoT0.1. 
The two sources are not transferring; sfso1noT1, sfso2noT1.  With transfer 
and three fully performing parties the sink will increase to sfsiT1 while 
both sources drop to sfso1T0.8, sfso2T0.8. However in case one of the 
sources will not give it´s share (sfso2T0.9) the other party has to 
compensate (sfso1T0.6) so that the sink will still reach sfsiT1. As we deal 
with saturating functions one source has to give more in compensation 
than the other sources saves. In case the sink is underperforming both 
sources have to give more substrate (sfso1T0.7, sfso2T0.7) so that sink will 
still reach sfsiT1. Underperformance within an ensemble can´t be 
compensated in a non-linear mathematical environment. An 
underperforming sink does more harm than one underperforming source.  
 
Up to now I have assumed that transfer of substrate will decrease the 
success of source and increase the success of sink: sfsonoT≥sfsoT and 
sfsiT≥sfsinoT. This is true for a substrate that will confer a positive net profit 
(b>c) to source and sink. It could be called simply an ease or advantage. 
The transfer of an advantage will be felt as a loss in source and as a gain 
in sink. In case we understand the success factor as a saturating benefit 
with a linear cost the transfer of a substrate could also confer a negative 
net profit (b<c) in source and sink and would have the meaning of a 
burden: sfsonoT≤sfsoT and sfsiT≤sfsinoT. The transfer of a burden will be felt 
as a gain in source and as a loss in sink. Figure 16 contains an example 
for such a case.  
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 16 
 
Figure 16: In picture A we look at a cross section within the reference surface. The 
green and blue curves belong to an active ensemble. The green circle stands for an 
ensemble transferring an advantage, the blue curve is an ensemble transferring a 
burden. 
At 0.5mM we cut parallel to source (B) and sink (C) axis. The green (transfer) and red 
(no transfer) curves belong to the transfer of an advantage (sfsonoT≥sfsoT and 
sfsiT≥sfsinoT). The success factors are set to: sfsonoT=1; sfsoT=0.9; sfsiT=0.1; sfsinoT1. The 
blue (transfer) and the black (no transfer) curves belong to the transfer of a burden 
(sfsonoT≤sfsoT and sfsiT≤sfsinoT). The success factors are set to: sfsonoT=0.1; sfsoT=1; 
sfsiT=0.9; sfsinoT1. 
 
The surprising observation is that transfer of a burden or transfer of an 
advantage is difficult to distinguish on the level of an ensemble.  
 
Discussion 
Discussion of the methodology 
There are biophysical and biochemical reasons why cells do not grow 
endlessly. The most important reason is diffusion limitation (surface to 
volume ratio). Economic reasons are tightly linked to this reason. The 
productivity saturates (Michaelis-Menten-kinetics saturates like m2/m3) 
while the cost increases in a linear fashion. Division into smaller units is 
a way out of the biophysical problem. As the size is cut in half, the 
genetic information is doubled. The doubling of information is a key event 
in organisms. Two identical cells regain biophysical advantages but also 
gain new statistical advantages. The possibility to lose the complete 
genetic information by random accidents drops from a specific value to 
the square of this value in single celled life. The probability to acquire 
any mutation will double for the doubled genome.  
So it is advantageous for cells to double.  
Double counting is considered a severe mistake in all sciences. Exactly 
this seems to have occurred within this paper in consequence of the 
introduction of an entanglement factor to entangle source and sink.  
Philosophic examinations on the relation of quantity and quality are 
colourful, complex and divers. In every-day life quality will be preferred 
over quantity and a lot of quality is preferred over a little quality. Quality 
is sometimes thought to arise from quantity including a phase transition. 
Quantity itself is interpreted as a type of quality by others. Counting is a 
measure to determine quantity. Quantity is basically a pure number (1, 2 
3, etc). “One meter” as example combines a quantity and a quality.   
Quality is defined as: “The standard of something as measured against 
other things of a similar kind; the degree of excellence of something; a 
distinctive attribute or characteristic possessed by someone or 
something.” Often a quality is described by words like “good or bad” and 
“high or low”. Although quality seems to be different in nature compared 
to quantity, quality can also be ranked by number (one or two smiley´s, 3 
or 5 stars).  
Quantity and quality seem to form the coordinate system of a two 
dimensional surface and each point on the surface is defined by an 
independent pair of both coordinates. Only in that surface we can 
discriminate between things of the same quantity but of different quality 
or vice versa. Quality is a dimension orthogonal to the dimension of 
quantity. If we observe only quantity quality will be a hidden variable.  
Within the transfer space a substrate is transferred from source to sink; 
after transfer source and sink act independently. The source is 
orthogonal to the sink. The net profit will increase or decrease in source 
and will increase or decrease in sink. A high net profit in a sink with the 
transferred substrate is an indicator of high quantity and high quality of 
sink. In case both parties are by genetic information or otherwise 
informational entangled the aspect of high quality is also true to a certain 
degree for the entangled source – the quantitative aspect of the 
transferred substrate is missing as the source is orthogonal to the sink. 
The additional, quantifiable productivity takes place only in sink. The 
same is true for the consideration of lost productivity and lost or gained 
net profit in source. There is no double counting of quantity. Quality 
appears as potential quantity. Quality is a hidden feature. Shares 
increase in price when “good news” promises future net profit. This net 
profit has not yet been realized. When the dividend will be paid the 
shares will drop again. The price of a young racing horse will be 
determined according to the family tree. This is making use of genetic 
entanglement with real success of other, older horses.   
Quantity and quality as well as source and sink are orthogonal 
dimensions. When we look at the ensemble we calculate the complete 
balance of the system of two parties. We look at a balance of genes or 
shares independent of their location in a top down manner (net profit of 
the ensemble) with a bottom up concept (separated results in source and 
sink). Genes and shares have always two aspects – quantity and quality. 
The net profit axis is now a combined axis summing up quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the ensemble consisting of source and sink.   
Cell division is a new type of quantity in comparison to a single cell of the 
double size. It is a transformation of quantity into quality – a new 
independent dimension appears. The cells have become physically and 
quantitatively independent. The (genetic) information is still identical in 
both new cells; they are qualitatively entangled. Entanglement starts with 
the appearance of similar or identical information in a new, independent 
organism (location). This is very similar to the viewpoint in Quantum-
Physics: “An example of entanglement occurs when a subatomic particle 
decays into a pair of other particles. These decay events obey the 
various conservation laws, and as a result, the measurement outcomes 
of one daughter particle must be highly correlated with the measurement 
outcomes of the other daughter particle.” (Quantum entanglement - 
Wikipedia)  
The term “correlation factor, cf” cold have also used instead of 
“entanglement factor, ef”. Correlation indicates a statistical relationship of 
two data sets or random variables. In a positive correlation the probability 
of one observation will increase with another observation. Both 
observations have lost statistical independence but a causal relationship 
is not necessarily indicated. In my biological examples the parties are 
connected by identical (ef1, clone) or similar (e.g. ef0.5, parent-offspring) 
genetic information. There is a causal reason for identical or similar 
biologic and biochemical observations; the genes and DNA are identical 
or similar. Entanglement is like correlation an indicator of deviation from 
random observations but we know the reason. 
After transfer we observe a real net profit change in sink; a quantity. I 
conclude from this observation a qualitative net profit change in source. 
In reverse I observe a net profit change of quantity in source and 
extrapolate a net profit change of quality in sink. I use direct 
proportionality and a linear relationship. This may be different in other 
areas. In Economy and Biology also trade-offs are observed; more 
quantity will mean less quality. Negative entanglement is imaginable and 
would be caused by any information increasing the probability of an 
observation not to be made (1-p). The size of entanglement of source 
and sink could be a function of and depend on other (changing) factors 
or change with time. Entanglement could also be a result of a saturating 
and a linear component, again. However, entanglement then is no longer 
a fixed long term component like in kinship. 
 
The self-entanglement of source (efso1)so  and sink (efsi1)si  is not 
changing the system. The appearance of a second, informational 
entangled but physically independent party is the important step. My 
model is completely different to all game theoretical models. I do not 
observe a single party interacting with other parties and strategies. It is 
necessary to understand what it means to explore an ensemble. 
Although an ensemble consists of two parties, the ensemble surface (in 
transfer space and ensemble space) is no indicator for the fate of the 
single party. As long as we examine source and sink we do not see the 
ensemble but when we look at the ensemble, source and sink are no 
longer separately tangible. The reason is that source and sink are two 
dimensional, orthogonal entities while the ensemble is a three 
dimensional entity. The entangled ensemble unites quantities and 
qualities as well as source and sink. 
 
Discussion of results 
Observation is the key to understand reality – not wishful thinking. 
Parents feed offspring – in some species, in others not. Sometimes the 
parents are consumed by offspring (parental cannibalism). In some 
species offspring feeds parents, sometimes to an extent that the 
offspring is consumed (filial cannibalism). Why do parents feed offspring 
although they are hungry? Why do wolves feed littermates while some 
sharks cannibalize their littermates in the womb; but isn´t that basically 
the same? We observe sterile young females (worker cast in e.g. bees or 
ants) and sterile old females (menopause). All these observations are 
the result of economic decisions. The economic decision process of all 
organisms has been shaped and optimized by evolution. What is the 
underlying common mechanism of the different and partly opposing 
decisions on the level of individual organisms? 
 
In figure 1 we look at a symmetric ensemble of two not entangled, no 
substrate transferring parties. They only invest in themselves. The 
saturating benefit and the linear cost in both sides lead to an optimum of 
single (two dimensional) and combined (three dimensional) net profit. 
Further increase in benefit will be exceeded by the increase in cost. This 
achievable maximum serves now as reference. The yellow surface has 
the same value as the red dot, the peak of the combined net profit. 
In figure 2 both sides are entangled by ef0.5. They share 50% quality as 
50% of the (genetic) information is identical. The net profit axis is now a 
combined axis of quantity and quality. All other properties of the two 
parties remain unchanged. This inactive ensemble is in many 
combinations of substrate concentrations superior to the best value of 
the inactive and not entangled ensemble of figure 1 not sharing quality.  
Although the ensemble in figure 3 is biochemically (Km, Vmax; cost) still 
symmetrically the ensemble has become asymmetric due to the fact that 
the success factor of one side (here called sink) is now much smaller 
(sfsinoT0.1). It is an ensemble with a weak party. This low value and an 
entanglement factor of ef0.5 indicate that this party is an offspring - a 
young, small and unexperienced entity. This inactive ensemble has a low 
net profit below the reference surface.  
Offspring is in many species protected and nourished by at least one 
parent. The ensemble becomes active and substrate is transferred to the 
offspring (fig. 4). The transfer of substrate with higher efficiency of 
productivity in offspring (sfsinoT0.1 increases to sfsiT1) and the symmetric 
entanglement of parent and offspring (ef0.5) increase the net profit of 
quantity and quality within this ensemble considerable over the reference 
surface. The small loss of productivity in the parent (sfsonoT1 decreases to 
sfsoT0.9) results in a small loss of net profit; over-compensated by far in 
the offspring.  The green surface appears in a concentration range in the 
parent where we also observe bso>cso. Such a condition has the 
biological meaning that even hungry parents feed offspring. 
From previous papers (5, 6) it was already clear that a source gives 
deliberately when the source is in bso-cso<0 or bso/cso<1, a condition 
where the additional benefit is smaller than the additional cost of a 
substrate. Only completely (over)saturated parents would feed offspring. 
In addition, they would under those conditions also feed non-relatives. 
One assumption was that the parent-offspring ensemble would be highly 
asymmetric. This is an option, but as parent and offspring share a lot of 
genes the biochemical asymmetry will be limited.  
Now, after I introduced entanglement also a hungry parent will feed 
(only) offspring under the set conditions. The relationship of decrease 
and increase in success factor is a reasonable assumption. The loss of 
the same food portion for the mature parent (sfsonoT1 to sfsoT0.9) has a 
different meaning for success in comparison to the gain in success for 
the small and still growing offspring (sfsinoT0.1 to sfsiT1). As mentioned in 
my basic assumptions the success factor could be interpreted as a 
saturating benefit with a linear cost. It is reasonable to think of the grown 
parent as in a much more saturated overall condition than the still 
growing offspring. 
In figure 5 we compare different degrees of entanglement. We could also 
say different degrees of relatedness. At a sfsoT0.9 and sfsiT1 the clone 
(ef1) ensemble is doing better than an ensemble of bee sisters (ef0.75) 
and they do better than an ensemble of parents and offspring (ef0.5) and 
they are better than an ensemble of grandparents and grandchildren 
(ef0.25). If I raise the success factor to sf2 only in parent and offspring 
they now do best although they are less related than a clone or bee 
sisters (still at sf1).  
The nutritional state of a parent is an important factor for the success of 
both parent and offspring. Worker bees do not have own offspring; they 
are sterile, they never will be a parent. Some of their sisters (ef0.75) of a 
later generation (the future queens) are better nourished and probably 
therefore have a higher success factor than the workers. The workers do 
not have offspring to whom they would be entangled only by ef0.5 and 
invest into their fertile sisters (ef0.75). The flow of substrate is from a low 
success source to a high success sink and into higher entanglement. 
Bees and ants also feed the present queen, their mother. They are 
entangled by ef0.5. The live span of workers during summer is only a few 
weeks in comparison to several years of their mother. The success factor 
(sfsiT) of the mother is in consequence much higher. So the offspring as 
source feeds the parent as sink here. This is a reversal of the usual 
pattern where the older parent with shorter residual lives span and 
therefore lower success factor is the source for the much younger sink 
with a longer residual lifespan and therefore a better success factor. Also 
at equal entanglement the flow of substrate is from low success (source) 
to high success (sink). This is the usual pattern of economy where 
investors prefer the better success factor in their investment decisions. 
 
Not all parents and offspring transfer substrate. Many species produce 
offspring and make no further investment. The investment of an 
ensemble has to consider several basic economic facts: 
• Each portion of substrate can only be invested once. Either the old 
offspring is fed (better performance) or new offspring is produced 
(larger number). 
• An increased investment in number will reduce the investment into 
performance or vice versa as the amount of substrate is limited. 
• Transfer or no transfer of substrate may have opposite effects on 
the ensemble and single parties. 
• The best ensemble will prevail. 
Two different species with different investment strategies should not be 
compared to understand the underlying economic decision process. We 
have two compare within the same species two competing investment 
strategies. Usually one of them will have already prevailed in the course 
of evolution and so the other is no longer observable. For an average 
genome the product of entanglement (ef0.5) and success factor (sf2) is 
one. This means that the genome is maintained within the population 
although it is diluted. It will neither increase nor decrease. The success 
factor is composed of many different to success contributing features. 
One of them is offspring number and the other is survival probability of 
parent or offspring. The ensemble making the best in parent and 
offspring out of the same food portion will prevail. Two opposing 
strategies are easily recognized with many shades of grey between 
them. The two strategies are a pure number (statistical) strategy with 
thousands or millions of offspring or a performance strategy with only a 
few offspring but additional investment later into the offspring. In figure 7 
we observe such two different ensembles. In 7A we observe offspring 
who needs help. Only after transfer of substrate (feeding, protection) we 
observe a successful ensemble (green). In 7B offspring needs no help. 
Now the non-transferring ensemble (red) is more successful than the 
transferring ensemble.   
Care within genetically entangled ensembles (genetic reciprocity) is 
successful in case the care recipient is responding with a strong increase 
in success factor. In human societies help to genetically unrelated 
persons is observed – usually under conditions of surplus or severe 
hardship. Is the model able to reveal this, too? Therefore, the 
entanglement between source and sink is reduced to zero (ef0, 
strangers, not genetically entangled). Two messages can be extracted 
from figure 8. At an identical success factor “no help” to a clone (red 
curve, fig. 8) is still much better than help to a stranger (fig. 9A, 9B; blue 
graph below the yellow reference line; red graph above the yellow 
reference line).  
However, the model is able to demonstrate local superiority of an 
ensemble with transfer between strangers at high and very low substrate 
concentrations in combination with a higher success factor (figures 8, 
and 9A and 9B) than in a comparable entangled party. The success 
factor is able to compensate for absent entanglement locally. 
Surprisingly there is room for charity in this completely selfish and 
rational model. The invested substrate is lost to the source. But the 
ensemble of strangers is doing locally better at a higher success factor 
than the biologically entangled ensemble at a lower success factor. In 
man a success factor is an argument per se. Therefore, in non-entangled 
human ensembles the size of success factors will be a central aspect of 
discussions and manipulations. A second ingredient will be the 
fabrication of apocalyptic stories with a scenario of hardship and menace 
as evolution has thought our species that giving to non-entangled parties 
is only useful then. The ensemble will end when in repeated cycles the 
source is constantly giving without the ability to regenerate in an open 
system.  
 
An increased success factor is able to completely compensate lower 
entanglement (ef>0). The case examined here (fig. 10, 11) has a 
biological meaning. Old females in the family of the four great apes 
(Hominidae) still bear offspring with the exception of humans. 
Menopause in human females renders old females sterile – why? 
Figures 10 and 11 suggest an answer. At a certain relationship of 
success factor to entanglement the investment of a grandmother into her 
grandchild (ef0.25, sfsoT0.9, sfsiT1) is better than an investment into her 
own child (ef0.5, sfsoT0.9, sfsiT0.5) at lower success factor. The reason is 
that the death of an old mother before the child becomes independent is 
a probable event, due to the long childhood phase in humans. In that 
case all investments into her child are lost. The same investment into her 
grandchild (ef0.25) will not be lost as there is still the younger mother, 
her daughter (ef0.5). This observation is supported by data from human 
populations (9). 
 
Besides setting the entanglement factor to zero (ensembles with 
strangers) the success factor can also be set to zero. Such an ensemble 
will end. For all the other ensembles there may be a next round. There 
are a lot of ensembles where we observe the last round in Biology. 
Below the yellow reference surface self-investment would be better. 
However this decision may be no longer an option. The question may 
now be: What is the smallest evil? The smallest evil could be to 
completely give up the sink, convert it to a source (fig. 12 blue) and make 
the most of it in this time period, which will definitively be the last time 
period for this ensemble. The green, red and black ensemble chooses 
unending terror by transfer or by inactivity while the blue ensemble 
chooses a terrible end. The end of an ensemble could have the meaning 
that one party will be lost completely. The other party will go one and be 
part of a new ensemble. The example in figure 12 could be interpreted 
as a model for cannibalism between parent and offspring (ef0.5). Two 
forms of cannibalism are observed. Offspring feeds on parent and parent 
feeds on offspring. In such extreme cases the success factors of source 
and sink are assumed to be very low. In case the source transfers 
everything to the sink the success factor of the source becomes zero 
(sfsoT0). The example in figure 12 could be read as follows: The parent 
feeds the offspring but the success factor stays very small. In addition, 
transfer is a severe mistake as the loss in the adult is not 
overcompensated by the offspring (green). In case of the blue graph the 
offspring now acts as source (back)-transferring everything to the parent. 
The parent survives with a much better success factor (sfsinoT0.2 
increases to sfsiT0.5). Such a parent may start in the next round with new 
offspring much better than the parent with a surviving but low quantity 
offspring.  
 
On the other side of rational charity to strangers (fig. 8) we find rational 
self-abandonment (fig. 12). Biologic entanglement in parents is ef0.5. 
Biologic success factors are difficult to determine but tend to be in 
average genes of sf2 (ef0.5*sf2=1). Entanglement is a matter of 
information. Besides genetic information there is cultural information. In 
human societies success factors as well as entanglement seems to be 
modifiable by deception and force. The ability to modify the perception of 
these factors opens a wide field for irrational outcome of rational 
decisions. Brotherhood (ef0.5) may be claimed where entanglement is 
near zero (ef0), success factors may be artificially increased with the 
promise of eternal life and endless material or immaterial rewards in a 
next live. In such a scenario of manipulated entanglement and success 
the own life and well-being may become rationally expendable. In this 
concept it is no longer necessary to manipulate the perception of hard 
facts like cost or benefit. Maybe it is much easier to manipulate the 
perception of soft factors or hard to check factors like success factor or 
entanglement. 
 
The next example (fig. 13, 14) is an example of a target conflict in 
Biology and Economy. Both aims – maximal increase of success factor 
per investment and largest success factor per same sized investment – 
can´t be reached simultaneously as the underlying functions are 
saturating. A just or equal distribution of the substrate between the two 
parties will not help and would not be reasonable. In Biology this is called 
parent-offspring conflict (10, 11). The parent tries to maximize the 
success factor within the younger offspring making the most out of the 
transferred substrate while the older offspring fights for more food to 
realize the better success factor. The ensemble has a conflict that can´t 
be resolved and has not been resolved by evolution. The distance 
between the blue and green curve is a direct measure for the intensity of 
the conflict. And yet, there is a solution when the success factors 
become similar over time so that the distance between blue and green 
curve will vanish. In addition, the model could be modified taking the 
relatedness of both sinks into account. Both sinks are either entangled 
by a factor of ef0.5 (siblings) or ef0.25 (half-siblings). Including the 
entanglement of the two sinks, the conflict would be resolved even 
sooner.  
((bso-cso)*efso+(bsi1-csi1)*efsi1+(bsi2-csi2)*efsi2)so*sfsonoT +  
((bso-cso)*efso + (bsi1-csi1)*efsi1 + (bsi2-csi2)*efsi2)si1*sfsi1noT +  
((bso-cso)*efso + (bsi1-csi1)*efsi1 + (bsi2-csi2)*efsi2)si2*sfsi2noT 
and 
((bso-cso)*efso+(bsi1-csi1)*efsi1+(bsi2-csi2)*efsi2)so*sfsoT +  
((bso-cso)*efso + (bsi1-csi1)*efsi1 + (bsi2-csi2)*efsi2)si1*sfsi1T (or *sfsi1noT) +  
((bso-cso)*efso + (bsi1-csi1)*efsi1 + (bsi2-csi2)*efsi2)si2*sfsi2noT (or *sfsi2T) 
 
In economy we observe the same target conflict. The classical investor´s 
dilemma is either to invest at a low success factor with a high yield or 
invest with a lower yield at a higher success factor. The size of the short 
term success factor seems to be essential to completely or partially 
compensate long term entanglement. In economic decisions the 
estimation of success factors can be influenced by true or deceptive 
information as already mentioned – e.g. like the starting of a Ponzi-
scenario. In the greylag goose larger eggs are preferred over smaller 
eggs in rolling them back into the nest (12). The reason is that the 
success factor of a larger egg is better than of a smaller egg. Eggs are 
discriminated according to the size of the already made investment and 
the size of the resulting success factor. In consequence the goose will 
prefer large artificial eggs over their own eggs. In evolution of the 
economic decision process an upper limit neither in man nor in goose 
seems to have developed for success factors too large to be true. 
 
Besides one source investing in two different sinks there is also the 
possibility that two sources invest in one sink (fig. 15). The biological 
equivalent here is the couple of male and female taking care for offspring 
and the importance of mate choice. Due to the non-linearity of benefit 
and net profit there will be no compensation for lack of performance in 
any party of an ensemble. Neither one of the parents nor the offspring 
should display a lack of performance. Mate choice has two aims: select a 
partner with good feeder attributes and good genes for successful 
offspring. We could here also introduce an additional entanglement 
between the two sources which would make them relatives.  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1+(bso2-cso2)*efso2+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so1*sfso1noT +  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1 + (bso2-cso2)*efso2 + (bsi-csi)*efsi)so2*sfso2noT +  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1 + (bso2-cso2)*efso2 + (bsi-csi)*efsi)si*sfsinoT 
and 
((bso1-cso1)*efso1+(bso2-cso2)*efso2+(bsi-csi)*efsi)so1*sfso1T +  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1 + (bso2-cso2)*efso2 + (bsi-csi)*efsi)so2*sfso2T +  
((bso1-cso1)*efso1 + (bso2-cso2)*efso2 + (bsi-csi)*efsi)si*sfsiT 
The entanglement of the two sources will increase the net profit with 
respect to shared quality but that would be inbreeding. The success 
factor of such offspring from genetically related sources will usually be 
smaller. The ensemble would have a bad performance finally. Not only 
the success factors in source and sink seem to be correlated but also the 
degree of entanglement between two sources will correlate to the 
success factor of the sink. In viscous populations inbreeding is observed 
regularly and could be taken into account in my model. The result 
obtained may also explain the formation of mating aggregations (lek) in 
birds. At low cost to wander around the females obtain an assessment of 
a quality type (attractiveness) and quantity (number of males) within a 
complete male genotype (all genetically related males within the lek) at 
the same place. The females obtain a top down view on a parental 
ensemble (the mother and father of the males).  
 
In figure 16 we observe the transfer of a burden: sfsonoT≤sfsoT and 
sfsiT≤sfsinoT. The biology behind this example is the observation that in 
many species with parental care offspring is carried. To move is an 
energy consuming behaviour. A single food portion can only be spent 
once – either for growth or for locomotion. It is important for offspring to 
grow as fast as possible to reduce certain risks associated with small 
body size. The offspring is now the source where weight is a relative big 
burden. The parent is the sink where the additional weight is only a small 
fraction of the total parental weight. When the offspring grows to a size 
comparable to the parent the smaller saving in the offspring is 
outweighed by the larger cost in the parent. The ensemble stops to 
transfer the burden and the offspring has to move on its own.  
In my calculations I have always assumed that both parents have the 
same entanglement with the offspring (ef0.5). This may be too simple. 
The mother confers much more genetic information (e.g. the genome of 
the mitochondria) to the joint offspring than the father. Maybe this was a 
starting point in evolution for the usual larger maternal investment into 
offspring. An entanglement of ef0 is also a matter of point of view. DNA 
sequencing and other biochemical facts prove that all life on earth has 
the same origin. This is the biological equivalent of a singularity. 
Therefore, it may be difficult to find ef0 in organisms on earth.  
 
In many of my examples I have compared two different ensembles either 
transferring or not transferring substrate. This could also be understood 
as the same ensemble with behavioural alternatives depending on the 
actual success factor and the better outcome.   
My paper could be falsely interpreted as a group-selection variant. Group 
selection is defined as: “a selection for traits that are beneficial to a 
population at the expense of the individual possessing the trait.” An 
ensemble consists of two biologic parties (source and sink) as diverse as 
male and female, parent and offspring, prey and predator, trees and root-
fungi or bees and flowers. A large flock of migratory birds saving energy 
by formation flight is an ensemble as well as populations of a tolerant 
host and a virulent parasite outcompeting an ensemble of a less tolerant 
host and a less aggressive parasite (or vice versa when both ensembles 
are separated physically and the arms race is at a distance). In all 
examples the parties act selfishly. There is no negative trait in my model; 
only substrate with a better or worse net profit here or there. Such a 
negative trait in group selection is altruism. Altruism is absent in my 
model. The ensemble concept is based on completely selfish acting 
entities. What counts is the outcome of an ensemble transferring 
substrate in competition with another ensemble not transferring 
substrate. Transfer under force may lead to suffering in one or both 
parties and yet the ensemble may have a better productivity. This has 
been called “wise exploitation” earlier. I would agree that “biological 
reciprocity” looks similar to “entanglement”. The use of quality within 
quantitative considerations reminds of the introduction of √-1 (i) and 
complex numbers. My interpretation is: entanglement is a bidirectional 
matter of quantity based quality shared by joint (genetic) information. 
Possibly other pairs of attributes - one visible, one hidden in two parties 
each - could be used in the context of entanglement. The complex 
ensemble of source (a) and sink (b) is: ze(so,si)=(a+bi)+(ai+b). Net profit is 
only a complex vector of quantitative net-profit (a, b) and qualitative net 
profit (ai, bi). 
 
Summary 
The basis of all my calculations is a net profit analysis within each party 
of an ensemble separately followed by the calculation of the combined 
net profit with regard to quality and quantity before and after transfer of 
substrate. Economic rationality guides source and sink and yet 
irrationality may develop. The transfer space in combination with 
entanglement by genetic information and success factors in source and 
sink is basically a very simple model. Besides the beauty of the graphs 
and surfaces they appear to be meaningful for a large and diverse set of 
biological phenomena. This model roots completely in biochemistry and 
is able to explain and unite a lot of different and contradicting 
observations in Biology and maybe in economy on the substrate money. 
 
Final remarks 
The aversion of selfishness and individual profit together with the idea to 
compare the benefit of one organism with the cost of another organism - 
genetically related or not - is basically a religious concept and roots in 
the parable of the “Good Samaritan” (13). To found biologic concepts on 
this ground may help to raise funds from wealthy religious foundations 
but is not science. There is no progress in getting the “Good Samaritan” 
out of equations (14) when you put him in first. Proceedings like this 
weaken the foundations of Biology and open a door to religious influence 
on scientific matters. The strategy behind is aimed at the justification of 
“institutional designers moving away from the assumption of universal 
self-interest” (15) and could be interpreted as attempt to lay foundation 
for dominant influence of external authorities with aura of moral 
superiority, infallibility and the final say. However, only the next 
experiment might have the final say. 
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